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INTRODUCTION

The forum non conveniens doctrine continues to breed controversy and questions more than sixty years after the Supreme Court's
decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert' first dictated how the doctrine is to

t B.S., Cornell University, 2005;J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2008; Managing
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 93. I am grateful to Professor Kevin Clermont for his
insight into this topic and feedback on this Note, and to Ben Carlisle, Joanna Longcore,
Ken Meyer, Michael Page, and Kate Rykken for their careful editing. Finally, I would like
to thank my family and friends for their love and support, and Brent Markus for his patience and devotion.
1 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The volume of scholarly writing
on forum non conveniens reveals the breadth of the controversy surrounding the topic.
See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal
Courts in Matters of Admiralty: An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12
(1949); Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on
the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IowA L. REv. 1147, 1150 n.22 (2006) (criticizing the
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine as unconstitutional and collecting
sources critical of the doctrine); David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens: "An Object Lesson in UncontrolledDiscretion,"29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 353 (1994) (criticizing the doctrine); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 785 (1985) (calling forum non conveniens a "crazy quilt"
of inconsistent decisions); Russell J. Weintraub, InternationalLitigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 352 (1994) (praising the doctrine as promoting fairness and
efficiency).
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be applied in federal courts. For example, as recently as March 2007,
the Supreme Court in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. held that a district court is not required to determine that it has personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction
before it can dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds.2 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion, which would have limited the availability of forum non conveniens dismissals. 3 Yet, the Third Circuit reached that decision with
"some regret, as [it] would like to leave district courts with another
arrow in their dismissal quivers." 4 The Third Circuit's articulation
suggests that district court judges favor dismissals in general and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in particular. 5 This may be especially likely because forum non conveniens dismissals are subject to
"very broad trial court discretion and extremely limited appellate
6
review."
The forum non conveniens test requires judges to weigh private
and public interest factors relevant to the convenience of the litigants,
the court, and the forum. 7 Unfortunately, this test results in inconsistent forum non conveniens decisions, 8 which are often detrimental to
foreign plaintiffs' ability to seek any remedy from American defendants in U.S. courts. 9 Moreover, questions persist about the legitimacy
of the concerns embodied in the public interest factors 10 and the inappropriate incentives driving forum non conveniens dismissals. This
Note argues that a shift in the framework under which judges approach these decisions, rather than an outright reformulation of the
127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007).
3 See Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349, 350 (3d Cir.
2006) (holding that a district court must determine that it has both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction before ruling on a forum non conveniens motion), rev'd, 127 S. Ct.
1184 (2007).
2

4

Id. at 364.

5 See id.
6 Robertson, supra note 1, at 359; see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
257 (1981) (reaching its decision in part because the Court "conclude[d] that the District
Court did not otherwise abuse its discretion").
7 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). Many commentators
and courts have thoroughly reviewed the basic elements of the forum non conveniens
analysis outlined by Justice Jackson in Gulf Oil and its companion case, Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). See, e.g., Martin Davies, Time
To Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REv. 309, 316 (2002);
Michael M. Karayanni, The Myth and Reality of a Controversy: "PublicFactors" and the Forum
Non Conveniens Doctrine, 21 Wis. INT'L L.J. 327, 331-35 (2003). Therefore, this Note offers
only a simplified summary.
8 See Stein, supra note 1, at 785.
9 Forum non conveniens dismissals that force a plaintiff to refile in foreign courts
are essentially outcome determinative. Plaintiffs rarely refile because issues of causation,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages make trial in the foreign forum impractical.
See Robertson, supra note 1, at 363-64.
10 See Karayanni, supra note 7, at 330-31.

2008]

STRIKING A BETTER PUBLIC-PRIVATE BALANCE

821

doctrine itself, can improve the predictability and legitimacy of the
forum non conveniens doctrine. District court judges could implement this modified approach by considering the (problematic) public
interest factors only in those circumstances in which some private interest factor already supports dismissal.

The Supreme Court set out the basic outline of the forum non
conveniens doctrine in 1947 in the companion cases of GulfOilll and
Koster.' 2 According to GulfOil, ajudge should only grant a forum non
conveniens dismissal in rare circumstances: when litigation in the
plaintiff's chosen forum would be highly inconvenient for the court,
the litigants, or both.' 3 In practice, however, defendants more than
"rarely" move for forum non conveniens dismissals. 14 A court may dismiss a case only if it finds that an adequate alternative forum exists
and that the balance of public and private interest factors indicates
15
that trial should be in that alternative forum.
Many scholars condemn the forum non conveniens doctrine 16 as
"arbitrary,"1 7 "incoherent,"'8 abused, 19 and even "unconstitutional. '"20
A few pieces of the scholarship, like this Note, focus on the public
interest factors. 2 1 Scholars have described the federal courts' current
approach to the public interest factors as "incoherent,"' 2 2 "inappropriate,"23 and "unprincipled."2 4 The standards courts currently apply
when considering the public interest factors are unclear, and courts
apply the doctrine in inconsistent ways. 25 Recognizing the limited
utility of the public interest factors, Britain's highest court unani11
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
12 Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
13 See GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508.
14 See Davies, supra note 7, at 311 ("Every year, federal courts consider hundreds of
motions for forum non conveniens dismissal."); Lear, supra note 1, at 1150-51 ("What is
clear is that virtually no case involving a transnational event is immune from a forum non
conveniens battle.").
15 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981).
16 See Lear, supra note 1, at 1150 n.22 (stating that "[t]he literature is replete with
criticism of the doctrine" and listing examples of academic literature critical of forum non
conveniens).
17

Id. at 1160.

18 Davies, supra note 7, at 312; Karayanni, supra note 7, at 330.
19 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 359-360. To be fair some commentators praise the
doctrine as efficient andjust. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 1;JeffreyJ. Kanne, Note, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: History, Application, and Acceptance in Iowa, 69 IowA L. REv.
975 (1984).
20 Lear, supra note 1, at 1159. A "more balanced position" may be that forum non
conveniens is simply "the best we can do" within our current system. Robertson, supra note
1, at 369.
21 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 7, at 351-64, 384; Karayanni, supra note 7, at 327-31.
22 Karayanni, supra note 7, at 330.
23 Davies, supra note 7, at 384.
24 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 380.
25 See infra Parts II-III.A.
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mously held that English courts should not base forum non conveniens decisions on considerations of the public interest. 2 6 Given the
significant controversy over the public interest factors, their uncertain
continuing utility, and the leeway permitted by wide judicial discretion, an approach that limits or refines the influence of the public
interest factors could increase the predictability and legitimacy of the
27
forum non conveniens doctrine.
This Note proposes that the public interest factors should not be
dispositive in a court's decision to dismiss a case on the basis of forum
non conveniens. Specifically, judges should approach the forum non
conveniens analysis with the understanding that the public interest
factors are merely supplementary: a court should consider the public
interest factors only if a private interest factor also weighs in favor of
dismissal. This change would address important policy concerns and
could be achieved without waiting for either Congress or the Supreme
Court to speak on the matter. 28 As argued below, limiting the work
done by the public interest factors would ameliorate complaints about
the redundancy of the doctrine. 29 In addition, this change would rein
in trial judges' "uncontrolled discretion" 30 by refraining the questions
that judges ask and the overall approach taken. It would also reduce
the federal judiciary's ability to create de facto foreign policy through
its treatment of foreign plaintiffs. Finally, curbing the influence of the
public interest factors could improve efficiency by increasing predictability and encouraging settlements.
Part I of this Note summarizes how courts currently apply the forum non conveniens doctrine. Part II assesses the problems with the
public interest factors and their inappropriate application to modern
litigation. Part III considers whether the public interest factors can
and should be dispositive by investigating how they interact with judicial approaches to forum selection clauses and sua sponte motions to
dismiss for forum non conveniens. Part IV addresses the significant
policy benefits of limiting the impact of the public interest factors in
light of the undue weight (uncovered in Part III) that courts give
them. This Note concludes by arguing that district court judges
26 See Lubbe v. Cape PLC, (2000) 1 W.L.R. 1545, 1567 (H.L.) (Eng.) (reporting that
Lord Hope would "decline to follow those judges in the United States who would decide
issues as to where a case ought to be tried on broad grounds of public policy").
27 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 378-79; Stein, supra note 1, at 818-22, 824.
28 For a detailed discussion of the policies implicated by the public interest factors'
role in forum non conveniens, see infra Part IV.
Commentators have criticized the public interest factors for addressing questions
29
of reasonableness and nexus that jurisdiction and venue rules are already designed to address. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 378; infra Part III.
30 Bickel, supra note 1, at 1 (subtitling his article on forum non conveniens: "An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion"); see Robertson, supra note 1, at 359, 362; Stein,
supra note 1, at 841.
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should engage in the forum non conveniens analysis with the understanding that the public interest factors represent dubious considerations and, therefore, should never be dispositive in a forum non
conveniens dismissal. The goal of this approach is to improve the predictability, fairness, and efficiency of the forum non conveniens
doctrine.

I
OVERVIEW OF THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE

Forum non conveniens serves a number of goals;3 1 the most important of which is preventing a plaintiff from causing injustice by
imposing undue inconvenience on the defendant or the forum.3 2 As
the Gulf Oil Court explained, a "plaintiff may not, by choice of an
inconvenient forum, vex, harass, or oppress the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble" that is unnecessary to the plaintiff's ability to pursue a remedy. 33 The doctrine also serves to correct
"failures" of venue and jurisdictional rules that may occur when a foreign plaintiff obtains jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in a federal court that is not an appropriate forum to hear the
case. 34 In other words, forum non conveniens serves as a "supervening venue provision" 3 5 to ensure that the dispute is properly connected with the federal forum. 36 To that end, the doctrine also
prevents forum shopping by those plaintiffs seeking the most
favorable law and promotes the efficient administration of justice by
31
32

See Karayanni, supra note 7, at 330-31.
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); 14D CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3828 (3d ed. 2007).
33 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
34 See Karayanni, supra note 7, at 341-43; Stein, supra note 1, at 785 ("[F]orum non
conveniens doctrine has come to accommodate the collective shortcomings and excesses
of modern rules governing jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law."). The forum non conveniens doctrine originally applied an "abuse-of-process" standard that only disturbed the
plaintiff's choice of forum in those rare instances in which a plaintiff's choice harassed a
defendant or imposed upon the power of a court. SeeJacqueline Duval-Major, Note, OneWay Ticket Home: The FederalDoctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the InternationalPlaintiff,77
CORNELL L. REV. 650, 678 (1992). More recently, a "most convenient forum" perspective,
which attempts to locate the dispute in the more convenient of the two alternative forums,

has dominated decisions. See id. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between forum non conveniens and jurisdictional rules, see infra Part III.
35 Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994).
36
See MICHAEL KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN AGE 74 (2004).
Professor Lear criticizes this characterization by arguing that Congress has asserted its full
power over venue and that courts can no longer exercise discretionary judgments. See
Lear, supra note 1, at 1186-87, 1193. Similarly, as argued in Part II, this rationalization
merely masks the jurisdictional nexus work that is supposed to be performed in a more
structured, consistent, and reviewable way by personal and subject-matter jurisdiction
rules. See Stein, supra note 1.
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ensuring that the dispute is heard in a forum with a sufficient connec37
tion to the case.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) authorizes transfers between federal district
courts if litigation in the initial district would impose a significant inconvenience on the parties and the court. 38 Therefore, forum non
conveniens dismissals are now sought only by parties claiming that litigation would be more convenient in a foreign forum. 39 When faced
with a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, federal judges
engage in a two-part analysis. In the first step of the forum non conveniens analysis, a district court must determine that an adequate alternative forum exists in which the case could be heard. 40 An
available forum is one in which the entire case and all parties would
be subject to jurisdiction, no statute of limitations would bar the suit,
no procedural bars to adjudication exist, and the defendant is amenable to service of process. 4 1 An alternative forum is adequate if the
parties will not be "deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly. ''42 If a

37 See Karayanni, supra note 7, at 341-42 (viewing forum non conveniens as a "vehicle
for the proper allocation of public resources or as a cordon against forum shopping").
38 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000). Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in 1948 to
allow district courts to transfer cases to another federal district court "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice." Id. Because a § 1404(a) transfer
is a far less draconian remedy than dismissal, a judge has more discretion and requires a
lesser showing of inconvenience to grant a § 1404(a) transfer than a forum non conveniens dismissal. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1955).
39
See Davies, supra note 7, at 313. In rare circumstances, litigants might also invoke
the doctrine if the more convenient forum is a state court or a territorial court. SeeWRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 32.

40 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1981). See generally Davies,
supra note 7, at 317-21 (providing a detailed discussion of the "adequate alternative forum" requirements).
41
See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1165 (5th Cir.
1987) (en banc). Judges very often condition forum non conveniens dismissals on defendants' agreeing to waive any jurisdictional defenses they might have in the foreign forum.
See, e.g., PiperAircraft,454 U.S. at 242; Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1551 (5th
Cir. 1991); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 634 F. Supp. 842,
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Courts often use conditional dismissals, see Davies, supra note 7, at
316, and defendants willingly agree to them because defendants assume that any dismissal
will be the end of the litigation. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 364. For example, a court
may grant a defendant's motion to dismiss on the condition that the defendant agrees to
waive any procedural bars and statute of limitations defenses or agrees to comply with
certain discovery requirements. See KARAYANNI, supra note 36, at 33-34 (listing the common and creative types of stipulations on which courts have conditioned forum non conveniens dismissals).
42 PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 255. Courts ordinarily do not consider the "possibility of
an unfavorable change in law" in the forum non conveniens analysis, but they may give it
substantial weight "if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate
or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all." Id. at 254.
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district court determines that an adequate alternative forum exists, 43
44
the court then considers the private and public interest factors.
The Gulf Oil decision sets out the core private and public interest
factors that a court must balance to decide a forum non conveniens
question. 45 The private interest factors assess the convenience to the
litigants of adjudication in the current federal forum relative to the
foreign forum. 46 The private interest factors include: the relative ease
of access to sources of proof; the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; the possibility of viewing premises, if necessary; the
enforceability of a judgment, if any; the relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial; and all other practical problems that make trial of a
47
case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
District court judges also consider public interest factors, which
incorporate the relative administrative inconvenience to the courts,
the communities, and third parties of litigation in the alternative forums.4

In particular, they consider:

the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the
"local interest in having localized controversies decided at home";
the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at
home with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of
unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of
of burdening citizens in an unreforeign law; and the unfairness
49
lated forum with jury

duty.

A single public interest factor probably could not support a valid forum non conveniens dismissal. 50 For example, the Supreme Court
stated that "the need to apply foreign law... alone is not sufficient to
warrant dismissal." 51 Similarly, a forum non conveniens dismissal
52
should not be based solely on docket congestion.
The Gulf Oil Court emphasized that the plaintiffs choice of forum should only be disturbed when the balance of factors strongly
43
The "adequate alternative forum" requirement is easily satisfied, and courts rarely
find a foreign forum inadequate, especially because defendants either willingly stipulate to
or courts condition dismissal on defendants' waiver of any objections to statute of limitations or jurisdiction in the foreign forum. See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and
Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L.
REV. 1161, 1169 (2005) ("The 'adequate alternative forum' prerequisite rarely prevents a
United States court from granting a forum non conveniens motion.").
44
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-08 (1947).
45
See id. at 508.
46
See PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 241.
47
See id. at 508.
48
See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
49
PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gulf Oil 330 U.S. at 509).
50 See Irwin v. World Wildlife Fund, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 29, 36 (D.D.C. 2006).
51
PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 260 n.29.
52
See Davies, supra note 7, at 364; Karayanni, supra note 7, at 341.
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favors the defendant. 53 However, the Court has also said that it is permissible for courts to give significantly less deference to the plaintiff's
choice if the plaintiff is foreign. 54 Regardless of whether the plaintiff
is domestic or foreign, a court must consider any relevant private and
public interests at stake. 55 Finally, the forum non conveniens determination is "committed to the sound discretion of the trial court," and
"its decision deserves substantial deference" and will only be reversed
56
if the trial court abuses its discretion.
II
THE PROBLEMATIC PUBLIC INTEREST FACTORS

The Third Circuit's reference to the number of arrows courts
have in their "dismissal quivers" 57 aptly captures the federal judiciary's
propensity for granting dismissals, especially in the context of forum
non conveniens. 58 Courts justify using the doctrine as part of their
inherent power to control their docket and prevent abuse of their
procedures. 59 If used sparingly, forum non conveniens can be a useful check to ensure that a case is sufficiently connected to the forum.
However, the doctrine must be properly formulated and applied to
ensure that forum non conveniens dismissals only occur in the right
cases.
For a variety of reasons, forum non conveniens dismissals are
uniquely attractive to judges. 60 For example, forum non conveniens
issues arise in federal court almost exclusively in cases involving a foreign party. 6' Judges can therefore often avoid complex conflict-oflaws questions and the burdens of applying foreign law by granting
53 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
54 See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256.
55 See id. at 241.
56 Id. at 257. "A district court may abuse its discretion by relying on an erroneous view
of the law, by relying on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or by striking an
unreasonable balance of the relevant factors." Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 511
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). However, Michael Karayanni observes that in practice
appellate courts thoroughly review all the relevant forum non conveniens factors as if conducting a de novo review. See KARAYANNI, supra note 36, at 46-48. He argues that this is the
better approach. See id.
57 Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349, 364 (3d Cir. 2006),
rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007); see supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
58 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 358.
59

See KARAYANNI, supra note 36, at 18.

60 See Heiser, supra note 43, at 1178 ("From the trial court's perspective, the fact that
it will face a choice-of-law determination and that the court may end up applying foreign
law, makes granting the defendant's forum non conveniens motion an attractive option.");
Robertson, supra note 1, at 357 ("[J]udges are quite likely to proclaim their fearsome workloads as a principal basis for granting forum non conveniens dismissals.").
61 See Davies, supra note 7, at 313. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides for transfer
between federal districts, whenever the alternative forum is another district court, transfer,
rather than dismissal, is the appropriate remedy. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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forum non conveniens dismissals. 62 District courtjudges are also subject to the "understandable temptation" to grant dismissals to reduce
docket congestion. 63 Thus, federal trial judges are under a number of
pressures that encourage them to grant dismissals for forum non
conveniens.
A basic, if not obvious, complaint about the current formulation
of the forum non conveniens doctrine is that it allows judges to dismiss suits on the basis of seemingly illegitimate reasons. When ajudge
uses considerations such as docket congestion as a basis for dismissal,
the judge fails to carry out the primary business of courts: adjudication. Refusing to adjudicate only because a given case would be difficult or time consuming is plainly illegitimate. 64 Yet, as Michael
Karayanni points out, "If the judiciary, a system with limited resources,
[did] not discriminate between disputes so that only those issues that
are properly connected to the local interests are litigated before the
local courts, justice might not be done in any case [ ].165 Because the
U.S. court system is a magnet forum often sought by foreign plaintiffs
with foreign disputes, "it is understandable why courts would want to
use a doctrine like forum non conveniens to control the stream of
litigation." 66 Even so, litigants should want to ensure that dismissals
based on forum non conveniens occur only in clearly appropriate
cases. Unfortunately, the doctrine as currently formulated and applied provides and, indeed, promotes inappropriate justifications for
67
dismissal.
At present, the forum non conveniens doctrine encourages federal judges both to consider inappropriate and irrelevant public interest factors and to grant forum non conveniens dismissals too
frequently. Judge Friendly referred to the "inevitable risk of... subconscious bias when [the] decision whether to dismiss a case because
of forum non conveniens is made by the judge who will have to try it if
62

See Heiser, supra note 43, at 1178.
Robertson, supra note 1, at 358 (noting that forum non conveniens "seems to be
the only area of the law in which it is considered legitimate for a court to base a decision
63

on the condition of its docket"). But see GARY B.

BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN

337 (3d ed. 1996) ("In general, the forum's docket has not played
a significant role in forum non conveniens analysis.").
64
See Bickel, supra note 1, at 47 (describing the "undesirability of treating the technique of discretionary dismissal as a matter of the court's power to regulate its calendar,
which if it exists, holds everywhere"); Hu Zhenjie, Forum Non Conveniens: An Unjustified
Doctrine, 48 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 143, 157 (2001). This argument calls to mind an eloquent
statement of ChiefJustice John Marshall: "We [the judiciary] have no more right to decline
the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one
or the other would be treason to the constitution." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
264, 404 (1821).
65 Karayanni, supra note 7, at 341.
Id.
66
67
See Heiser, supra note 43, at 1178-79.
UNITED STATES COURTS
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the motion is denied." 68 The particularly attractive attendant benefits
of a forum non conveniens dismissal reinforce that "subconscious
bias." Two features of the forum non conveniens doctrine interact to
exacerbate this problem and impede the effectiveness and legitimacy
of the forum non conveniens doctrine: (1) the public interest factors
themselves and (2) the district courts' wide discretion to grant forum
non conveniens dismissals and the limited appellate review of such
dismissals. 69 Numerous problems exist in the current formulation
and application of Gulf Oil's public interest factors. 70 For example,
although PiperAircraft instructs that a court should consider all public
and private factors in every forum non conveniens decision, 71 Professor Davies explains that the public interest factors are not well suited
to current international civil litigation. 7 2 Globalization and courts'
improved ability to discover foreign law weakens the weight that certain factors-such as the difficulty of discovering and applying foreign
law-should have in favor of dismissal in international forum non
conveniens cases. 73 Modern procedural rules and the frequency with
which federal courts must deal with international litigation have sig74
nificantly eased the burden of discovering and applying foreign law.
Furthermore, gathering evidence and taking witnesses' testimony has
75
become substantially easier due to technological advances.
In federal court, virtually all forum non conveniens questions
arise in international cases. Therefore, the "need to apply foreign
68 Hon. HenryJ. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754 (1982);
see also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing whyjudges often favor dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds).
69 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 359-60 (describing the wide discretion trial courts
enjoy in granting dismissals for forum non conveniens); Stein, supra note 1, at 784-85,
821-22, 824; supra note 56 and accompanying text.
70 See Davies, supra note 7, at 353, 372-78 (arguing that "consideration of the public
interest should either be abandoned altogether, or should be much broader, focusing on
the interests of the forum state as a whole, not merely the administrative convenience of its
courts"); Karayanni, supra note 7, at 337-52 (arguing that the current public/private distinction is "incoherent"). Some also question the usefulness of the Gulf Oil private factors.
For example, evidentiary concerns, such as the "ease of access to sources of proof," Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), are less important now than they were in
1947 because of technological advances that allow videotaped depositions; DVD recordings
to replace the need to "view the premises," and the like. See, e.g., Lear, supra note 1, at
1193-94.
71
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
72
See Davies, supra note 7, at 358.
73 See id.
74
See Lear, supra note 1, at 1192-93. Increased globalization has concomitantly increased the frequency with which courts face questions involving the application of foreign
law. As a result, the burden on local juries of applying foreign law as well as the burden on
the parties and the court of discovering and applying foreign law are less onerous now
than they were in 1947 when Gulf Oil was decided. See id.
75
See Davies, supra note 7, at 324.
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law" factor is commonly raised. 76 Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure admits a broad range of materials and sources to establish the content of foreign law. 77 The rule makes discovering and
applying foreign law much less difficult than it was when the Supreme
Court decided Gulf Oil in 1947.78 Nevertheless, district court judges
continue to treat the need to apply foreign law as a factor strongly
pointing toward dismissal. 79 Thus, this once valid concern now lends
false support to possibly biased forum non conveniens dismissals.
PiperAircraft limited the importance of "the need to apply foreign law"
factor by announcing that this need, without more, is insufficient to
warrant dismissal. 80 Still, the Supreme Court should further narrow
the doctrine so that judges cannot rely on the attendant public factor
considerations-such as the need to rely on expert witnesses, the
avoidance of complex conflict-of-laws questions, and the interests of

the foreign jurisdiction 8 1-to

justify dismissals. 82

Next, the docket congestion factor is problematic because many
other types of litigation, such as class actions and multiparty securities
claims, are more time consuming and complex than the ordinary
transnational dispute. 83 Furthermore, weighing court congestion
does little to identify that one dispute is more inconvenient than another because docket congestion is such a common problem that it
will almost always weigh in favor of dismissal. 84 Moreover, the forum
85
non conveniens analysis itself is often complicated and involved.
76 See id. at 354.
77 See FED. R. Ciy. P. 44.1.
78 See Davies, supra note 7, at 358 (" [I] t is fair to say that the need to consider foreign
law should no longer be as significant a factor in the forum non conveniens analysis as it
was when Gilbertwas decided. Nevertheless, district courts continue to regard the applicability of foreign law as a factor strongly indicating forum non conveniens dismissal, occasionally still referring to the difficulties posed by the need (now long past) to rely on
expert witnesses.").
79

See id.

80 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260 n.29 (1981).
81 See Davies, supra note 7, at 357-58.
82 Interestingly, in the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, a forum non conveniens
dismissal is prohibited if the choice-of-law analysis indicates that a U.S. law should govern
the dispute. See id. at 358.
83
See Lear, supra note 1, at 1193.
84 See Karayanni, supra note 7, at 344.
85 See generally Phoebe A. Wilkinson, Should Foreign Plaintiffs' PersonalInjury Suits Be
Litigated in U.S. Courts?, LAW.cOM, July 12, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleLLF.jsp?id=1152608727402 ("Motions to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens will often involve detailed, complex, competing submissions from foreign law
experts, advising the U.S. court of the principles and nuances of the plaintiffs home country's legal systems. Such motions may be filed after discovery relevant to the forum non
conveniens issue has been taken. As a result, U.S. courts engage in time-consuming, factintensive, complex inquiries in order to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction over a
case involving a plaintiff from a foreign country.").
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Finally, GulfOil's concern about burdening local juries is not tenable. If a federal district court has jurisdiction and venue over a case,
some reasonable connection between the forum's citizens and the dispute necessarily also exists; either the jurors "reside in the same district with the defendant or the dispute involves events or omissions"
that occurred in the forum. 8 6 In sum, the public interest factors delineated in Gulf Oil have become less relevant, and as a result, courts
should not heavily rely on them when deciding whether to grant a
forum non conveniens dismissal.
III
THE RISK OF DISPOSITvE PUBLIC INTEREST FACTORS

Assuming the public interest factors are indeed faulty, a number
of questions follow: How important are the public interest factors in
the forum non conveniens decision given the consensus that the private interest factors are usually more important? Even if the public
interest factors embody largely irrelevant and inappropriate concerns,
is there any reason to think that judges actually give them undue
weight? And, most importantly for our purposes, could a federal
court use forum non conveniens to dismiss a properly situated case
merely on the basis that the case inconveniences the judiciary and the
forum? In other words, could a court base a forum non conveniens
dismissal solely on the public interest factors?8 7 A number of courts
imply that the answer to this last question is "yes."8 8 As a result, a
plaintiff can be denied a federal forum to hear the claim, and very
often any opportunity to litigate the dispute at all, 8 9 merely because of
administrative inconvenience. This perspective exacerbates the problem that the public interest factors present on their own and represents excessive judicial control. Moreover, this perspective supports
the complaint that forum non conveniens allows federal judges "un-

86
Lear, supra note 1, at 1193; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b) (2000). Admittedly, the
discussion here oversimplifies the personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and
venue issues involved. For a complete discussion of these issues and their relationship to
forum non conveniens, see Stein, supra note 1.
87
In practice, defendants almost always want a forum non conveniens dismissal for, at
worst, the benefits of delay and, at best, the outcome-determinative effect of ending the
litigation. Thus, defendants are motivated to produce evidence of both public and private
inconveniences of adjudication in the U.S. forum and in favor of adjudication in the foreign forum. See Heiser, supra note 43, at 1184-85.
88
See Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947);Jackson v.
Am. Univ. in Cairo, 52 F. App'x 518, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion) (focusing
on the use of the disjunctive "or" in Koster).
89 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 364 ("Quite typically plaintiffs who suffer forum non
conveniens dismissal are unable to go forward in the foreign forum.").
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controlled discretion" 90 to dictate whether plaintiffs will have their
claims heard, 9 1 whether American corporate defendants will be accountable for their actions in foreign lands, 92 and which cases will remain on their dockets. 93 The federal judiciary has shown no signs
that it is willing to give the bulk of the public interest factors the relatively little weight they deserve. Therefore, the need to limit the influence of those factors is even more acute.
A.

The Current Approaches to the Forum Non Conveniens
Balancing Test

Because the Supreme Court failed to give any specific guidance
on how to balance or apply the public interest factors, 94 their treatment varies among the circuits.95 The few federal courts that have
specifically considered whether the public interest factors can be determinative appear to take as a matter of course that a case can be
dismissed solely because of the inconvenience the adjudication of that
case would impose on the court, regardless of any inconvenience to
the parties themselves. Although many courts, including the Supreme
Court in Piper Aircraft, simply refer to balancing private and public
interest factors together, 96 the Piper Aircraft Court also stated that a
court may dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds "when
trial in the chosen forum would 'establish ...oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiffs convenience,' or when the 'chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of
considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal
problems."' 97 The use of the disjunctive "or" indicates that either the
public or private interest factors alone may be enough to warrant a
forum non conveniens dismissal. 9 8 The D.C. Circuit Court and the
D.C. district court have each explicitly advanced this interpretation,
90 See Bickel, supra note 1, at 1 (subtitling his forum non conveniens article: "An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion"); Robertson, supra note 1, at 371 (borrowing Professor Bickel's phrase to criticize the doctrine as applied after Gu/f Oil).
91
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32.
92
See Lear, supra note 1, at 1191 ("[T]he federal courts immunize American corporate defendants from regulation at home and liability for acts abroad."); Duval-Major, supra
note 34, at 651.
93 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 380 ("Forum non conveniens in its present form is
simply too unprincipled to be justified by whatever effectiveness it might have as a way of
rationing scarce judicial resources.").
94 See Stein, supra note 1, at 814-15.
95 See Davies, supra note 7, at 351.
96 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981); infra cases collected in
note 101.
97 PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 (alteration in original) (quoting Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947)).
98 SeeJackson v. Am. Univ. in Cairo, 52 F. App'x 518, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion).
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but neither court has affirmed a dismissal based solely on the public
interest factors. 99 A California district court also espoused this disjunctive view.1 00 Although a literal reading of PiperAircraft and Koster
supports this view, no court has thoughtfully considered whether reliance on public interest factors alone is an appropriate or desirable
interpretation and application of the forum non conveniens doctrine.
On the other hand, many of the Supreme Court's cases, (again)
including PiperAircraft, use the conjunctive "and" to describe how the
factors should be considered and balanced in the forum non conveniens analysis.' 0 1 According to Professor Davies, the "[PiperAircraft]
court implied that all public and private factors should be considered
in all cases." 10 2 Judges operating under this interpretation should require that both the public and private interest factors together favor
dismissal before granting a forum non conveniens dismissal.
Although most circuits consider both public and private factors
and give the same weight to both, the Fifth Circuit considers the public interest factors only when the "court cannot determine whether
[the] private factors weigh in favor of dismissal."' 0 3 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit will not consider the public interest factors at all if the private
factors favor dismissal.104 This "sequential" view significantly alters the
potential impact of the public interest factors; presumably, they will be
considered less often, but if they are considered and a dismissal results, the public interest factors will have been dispositive. The Fifth
Circuit justifies its approach, which contradicts PiperAircraft's suggestion to consider all private and public factors in all cases, 10 5 as providing "structured discretion founded on a procedural framework [to
99 See id.; BPA Int'l, Inc. v. Sweden, 281 F. Supp. 2d 73, 85 (D.D.C. 2003) ("The weight
of either the private interest factors or the public interest factors alone may be cause for
dismissal.").
100
See Van Schijndel v. Boeing Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 766, 781 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (stating
that "the public interest alone may require dismissal"), affd, No. 06-55930, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 380 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2008) (unpublished opinion).
101
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981); Kamel v. Hill-Rom
Co., 108 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 1997) (calling for balancing of public and private factors
together); Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 981 F.2d 1345, 1354-58 (1st Cir. 1992) (considering public and private factors together); Lion de Mer S.A. v. M/V Loretta D, No. JFM-98921, 2000 WL 198335, at *3, *5 (D. Md. Feb. 17, 2000) (holding that private factors indicating dismissal are "not... determinative" and that it is necessary to consider public factors
as well). PiperAircraft's apparent "inconsistency" has not been addressed in the academic
literature.
102 Davies, supra note 7, at 351.
103
Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1550-51 (5th Cir. 1991).
104
See, e.g., id.; In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1165
(5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); S&D Trading Acad., LLC v. AAFIS, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 558,
571 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Perforaciones Maritimas Mexicanas S.A. de C.V. v. Seacor Holdings,
Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 825, 834 (S.D. Tex. 2006). See generally Davies, supra note 7, at 352
(describing the Fifth Circuit's approach).
105
See Davies, supra note 7, at 351.
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guide] the district court's decisionmaking process."1 0 6 However, district courts in the Fifth Circuit do not always follow the Circuit's prevailing view, 10 7 thereby undermining this worthwhile goal. The
Eleventh Circuit recently backed away from this approach, stating that
"even though the private factors are 'generally considered more important' than the public factors, the better rule is to consider both
factors in all cases."1 0 8 The Fifth Circuit's unique, and likely erroneous, approach could be a useful tool for increasing predictability and
limiting judicial discretion in applying the public interest factors.
B.

Evaluating Dispositive Public Interest Factors in Action

As discussed immediately above, the few federal courts that have
explicitly addressed the issue assert that the public factors alone can
support a dismissal. Other courts have implicitly supported this conclusion. For example, after the Court in Piper Aircraft said that "the
private interests point in both directions,"10 9 it affirmed the trial
court's dismissal, seemingly on the public interest factors alone. 110
Given the significant problems with the public factors detailed in Part
II, the propriety of this position is questionable.
Fortunately, the dispositive potential of the public interest factors
is not firmly settled. The dominant approach, and the "better rule"
according to the Eleventh Circuit, "is to consider both factors in all
cases."1 1 1 Moreover, courts largely avoid these issues by describing the
112
test and explaining their application of it only in general terms.
This Note, in an effort to uncover whether the public factors are potentially dispositive under current law and whether this is a good policy, examines two contexts in which dispositive public interest factors
should be readily apparent: valid forum selection clauses and sua
sponte motions for forum non conveniens dismissals. First, significant
controversy surrounds the treatment of forum non conveniens in contract disputes involving forum selection clauses. 113 Can a court dis106
107
108

In re Air Crash Disaster,821 F.2d at 1165.
See Davies, supra note 7, at 352 n.204 (collecting cases).
Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting 17 JAMES

WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 111.74(3)(b) (3d ed. 2000)).

109
110

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
See Stein, supra note 1, at 824 ("After finding the conveniences in relatively equal

balance, the Court could reverse the court of appeals only by relying on the public-interest
factors ..
" (footnote omitted)). But cf D'Alterio v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 845
A.2d 850, 855 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (reversing for abuse of discretion a forum non conveniens dismissal based only on the public factors). D'Alterio indicates that Pennsylvania
requires both private and public factors to favor a forum non conveniens dismissal. See id.
III Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311.
112 See Stein, supra note 1, at 815, 831-32.
113 See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Forum Selection in International Contract Litigation:
The Roe ofJudicialDiscretion, 12 WILLAMETrEJ. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 185 (2004) (explor-
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miss a case properly situated under a forum selection clause on the
grounds of forum non conveniens? If the law deems the parties to
have waived complaints about private inconvenience by agreeing to a
forum in advance, the only ground on which to grant a forum non
conveniens dismissal, if available at all, is the public inconvenience of
litigation in that particular forum. Second, can a judge permissibly
raise a sua sponte motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens? At
least when the parties agree to the forum, a sua sponte dismissal is
necessarily predicated exclusively on the public interest factors. Permitting such a dismissal implies that a court can dismiss litigation
1 14
solely because of inconvenience to the court.
1. Forum Selection Clauses
In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Supreme Court held that
forum selection clauses are prima facie valid and enforceable unless
115
enforcement would be "unreasonable" under the circumstances.
According to Professor Buxbaum, "Most U.S. courts hold that forum
non conveniens analysis is relevant even in cases involving valid forum
selection clauses."'1 16 By enforcing the parties' forum selection, the
Bremen decision should "reduc[e] the judicial role to a consideration
of public-interest factors alone."' 17 However, courts have diverged in
their approaches to the effect of forum selection clauses on forum
118
non conveniens analysis.
A few courts suggest that the Bremen rule precludes forum non
conveniens analysis entirely. 119 For these courts, only if inconvenience rises to the level of unreasonableness is the forum selection
clause not outcome determinative on a motion to dismiss. 120 This foling the interplay between forum non conveniens and the enforcement of forum selection
clauses).
114
Sua sponte dismissals appear to have been authorized early in the doctrine's American existence, see Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law,
29 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 2 (1929), as part of a court's inherent power to prevent abuse of their
procedures. See, e.g.,
Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos v. M/T Respect, 89
F.3d 650, 656 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996). However, this reasoning is murky. See infra Part III.B.2.
Moreover, when courts exercise their "power" to dismiss cases sua sponte based on forum
non conveniens, they often provide weak support to justify their action. For example, the
dissent in Ferens v. John Deere Co. refers only to the long-recognized power to dismiss sua
sponte on forum non conveniens grounds and speaks of the power in the context of the
interdistrict transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See 494 U.S. 516, 537 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
115
See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co,407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
116
Buxbaum, supra note 113, at 189.
117
Id. at 193.
118
See id. at 196-98 (describing the various approaches and citing cases).
119
See, e.g., AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Nimelias Enters., S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 526 (7th Cir. 2001);
Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d 505, 509-10 (2d
Cir. 1998).
120
See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
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lows from Bremen's refusal to enforce forum selection clauses that result in unreasonable inconvenience. 2 1 For example, if the selected
forum is "seriously inconvenient," such as when a contract of adhesion
provides for a foreign forum to resolve a local dispute or the serious
inconvenience was unforeseeable at the time of contracting, a court
12 2 If
may find the clause unreasonable and therefore unenforceable.
the forum selection clause is found unenforceable, a court would then
conduct traditional forum non conveniens analysis, which permits a
3
broader examination of inconvenience.12
Other courts apply Bremen narrowly, precluding only consideration of the private interest factors on the basis that the parties' affirm124
ative forum selection in the contract displaces those factors.
Presumably, in agreeing to the clause, the parties "indicated that litigation in the chosen forum would not be prohibitively costly or burdensome."' 12 5 This interpretation is supported by the Bremen decision,
which doubted that claims of private "inconvenience should be heard
to render the forum clause unenforceable." 126 This second approach
coincides with the dual purposes of the forum non conveniens doctrine-to protect the litigants as well as the forum from undue burden-because it does not foreclose consideration of the public
factors. 127 Under this view, the presumption in favor of the forum the
parties chose in a valid forum selection clause can be overcome
only "if there is inconvenience to some third party . . .or to the

judicial system itself," as distinct from inconvenience to the party
seeking [dismissal]. That party's inconvenience has no weight...
because the party waived any objection based on inconvenience to it
by agreeing to the clause. But it could not waive rights of third parties, or the interest of the federal judiciary in the orderly allocation
128
of judicial business.

Finally, some courts facing a forum non conveniens decision in
the context of a forum selection clause treat the contractual choice of
forum as "simply one of the factors that should be considered and
balanced by the courts in the exercise of sound discretion."1 29 Like
the forum non conveniens analysis, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) instructs dis121
122
123
124

See id. at 15-16.
See id. at 16-18.

125

See Buxbaum, supra note 113, at 197.
See infra text accompanying note 128.
Buxbaum, supra note 113, at 198.

126

Bremen, 407 U.S. at 16.

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32; Buxbaum, supra note 113, at 195.
128 IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, 437 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir.
2006) (Posner, J.) (first omission in original) (quoting Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916
F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990)).
129 Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria E Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906
F.2d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 1990).
127
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trict courts to decide interdistrict transfer motions by weighing casespecific factors of convenience and fairness. 130 In that context, the
Supreme Court adopted this third approach and held that district
courts must "integrate the factor of the forum-selection clause into
1 31
[their] weighing of considerations as prescribed by Congress.
In sum, courts analyze motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens in cases validly situated under forum selection clauses in divergent ways. The first view suggests that the administrative
inconveniences normally subsumed under the public interest factors
are generally insufficient to overcome the private choice of forum
made in a forum selection clause. 13 2 This view resists acknowledging
that inconvenience to the court and third parties can be dispositive
because this approach undertakes a full forum non conveniens analysis only if the chosen forum is unreasonable. This is a much higher
standard than the forum non conveniens standard of mere inappropriateness. 133 Yet, because a party could, through a showing of public
inconvenience, carry its burden to establish the unreasonableness required to abandon the forum selection clause and engage in forum
non conveniens analysis, this approach illuminates a possible solution
to the unpredictability of forum non conveniens. Courts could apply
a stricter "unreasonableness" standard to the public interest factors to
limit their impact and to reduce the abuse permitted by the wide discretion of trialjudges.1 3 4 The second approach suggests that the public factors could lead to a forum non conveniens dismissal in the
absence of private factors because the contract precludes their consideration.13 5 This is consistent with the view that either the public or
private factors can be dispositive. The third approach does not preclude consideration of the private factors, despite Bremen's suggestions
to the contrary, and thus sheds little light on the question of whether
the public interest factors can be dispositive.
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 437 U.S. 22, 29 (1988).
Id. at 29-31 ("The forum-selection clause, which represents the parties' agreement
as to the most proper forum, should receive neither dispositive consideration .. .nor no
consideration ....
but rather the consideration for which Congress provided in
§ 1404(a).").
132
Cf Vogt-Nem, Inc. v. M/V Tramper, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1234 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(giving effect to a forum selection clause by dismissing sua sponte for forum non conveniens even though the parties agreed to waive the clause and wanted to stay in the U.S.
forum and without any discussion of the public interest factors).
133
See Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (holding
that dismissal for forum non conveniens can be had "upon a clear showing of facts
which .. .make trial in the chosen forum inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems").
134
See infra note 204 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this potential
solution.
135
See IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, 437 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir.
130
131

2006) (Posner, J.).
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Two trends are discernable from these divergent approaches.
First, at least some courts continue to evaluate the public interest factors when faced with a valid forum selection clause. Second, courts'
forum non conveniens decisions generally support the proposition
that judges view the public interest factors as potentially dispositive.
Beyond those generalizations, the divergent approaches suggest that
the current formulation of forum non conveniens does not optimize
predictability and efficiency.
2.

Sua Sponte Dismissal Power

Anyone with only a basic understanding of forum non conveniens would likely be surprised to learn that, despite complying with
all venue and jurisdictional requirements, and in the absence of any
motion by, or inconvenience to, a defendant party, a court may dismiss a plaintiff's case on the basis of forum non conveniens purely to
avoid burdening the judiciary and forum. As discussed below, the
courts that have explicitly faced the issue apparently assume that a
trial judge has the power to dismiss a case sua sponte on the basis of
forum non conveniens. 1 36 This conclusion is consistent with the view
137
that the public interest factors alone can warrant dismissal.
Admittedly, courts rarely raise forum non conveniens sua
sponte 1 3 8 The benefits of delay, harassment, and, hopefully, dismissal
motivate defendants to raise forum non conveniens on their own initiative. 139 Even when a court sua sponte raises forum non conveniens, a
defendant, motivated by those benefits, will certainly produce some
evidence of private inconvenience to support dismissal-an easy task
given that the private interest factors include all "practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive."' 40 However, the legitimacy of the sua sponte power is questionable because it
fails to give sufficient deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum and
enhances the importance of inappropriate considerations, such as the
difficultly of discovering and applying foreign law, court congestion,
and the complexity of the dispute. Further, this sua sponte power
highlights the excessive discretion and control that federal judges
wield under this doctrine, especially in applying the public interest
136
See, e.g., Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos v. M/T Respect, 89 F.3d
650, 656 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996). But see Oil Basins Ltd. v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co., 613 F.
Supp. 483, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("declin[ing] to 'order such a drastic remedy sua
sponte.'").
137
See Karayanni, supra note 7, at 337 (" [G] rounding the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the public interest led some states to authorize courts to raise the forum non
conveniens issue sua sponte.").
138
See Kelly v. Kelly, 911 F. Supp. 70, 71 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
139
See Lear, supra note 1, at 1150-51.
140
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
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factors.14 1 Moreover, if neither party objects to the venue, the trial
judge contributes additional uncertainty to the litigation by raising
the forum non conveniens issue sua sponte. That practice, when com-

bined with the often unprincipled application of the doctrine, should
not be tolerated.
Federal judges have good, but possibly erroneous, historical and
doctrinal reasons to presume (and exercise) their power to dismiss
sua sponte for forum non conveniens. This sua sponte power is best
justified as an extension of a court's inherent power to regulate its
docket as a matter of administrative necessity. 142 However, the view
that a sua sponte power is part of the "general discretionary power" of
43
courts to decline jurisdiction when the local forum is inappropriate
is tenuous in light of the many statutes enacted to regulate jurisdictional matters. 144 Court-access doctrines, designed to ensure a sufficient connection between the dispute and the forum, are duplicated
in purpose and effect by the forum non conveniens analysis. Hence,
the mandatory presence of jurisdiction and venue requirements undercuts any argument that the need for control over administrative
matters requires that judges have the power to raise forum non conveniens sua sponte.
Federal judges might assume they possess the power to dismiss
sua sponte for forum non conveniens for another reason. In 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), Congress granted federal courts the power to transfer cases to another federal district court on their own motion "[f1 or
145
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."
The factors considered in a § 1404(a) transfer are the same as the
141
142

See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
See KARAYANNI, supra note 36, at 18. Inherent powers include:

the power of a federal court to control admission to its bar, punish parties
for contempt, vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been
perpetrated upon the court, bar a disruptive criminal defendant from the
court room, dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens, act SUA
SPONTE to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute, and assess attorney's fees
against counsel.
Glatter v. Mroz (In re Mroz), 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 n.9 (1Ith Cir. 1995) (citing Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) ("[Under a federal court's inherent power,] [i]t may
; and it may act sua sponte to
dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens ...
dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute." (citations omitted))). It is interesting to note that,
in this well-known language, "sua sponte" is absent from the clause describing the federal
courts' inherent power with respect to forum non conveniens.
143
See KARAYANNI, supra note 36, at 19 n.7.
144
See Lear, supra note 1, at 1186-87 ("The congressional venue scheme . . . is vast,
encompassing the general venue provisions, a myriad of special provisions, as well as the
transfer options in § 1404 and § 1406. Given the comprehensiveness of the congressional
venue regime, it seems unlikely that the judiciary retains the inherent power to create a
,supervening venue provision' [forum non conveniens] for the routine transnational case."
(footnotes omitted)).
145
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
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forum non conveniens factors. 14 6 However, forum non conveniens
dismissals require a greater showing of inconvenience because the dismissal remedy is significantly harsher on the plaintiff. Thus, courts
should not infer a sua sponte power to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens directly from their power to transfer sua sponte under
§ 1404(a). 147 For example, the district court in Vogt-Nem cited only
§ 1404(a) and precedent involving sua sponte transfer under that section to justify a sua sponte dismissal based on forum non conveniens
even though the defendant agreed to waive an otherwise valid forum
selection clause situating the litigation in the Netherlands. 148 This illustrates not only courts' willingness to dismiss sua sponte for forum
non conveniens but also the ambiguous and dubious justification for
1 49
that power.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed a sua sponte dismissal in the context
of a forum selection clause and explained that the plaintiff showed
"no legal basis for objecting to the sua sponte nature of the district
court's dismissal on [forum non conveniens] ground[s] ." 15 0 That
court took the absence of any black-letter law prohibiting sua sponte
dismissals as an affirmative endorsement of the power's existence. 151
Federal courts accept that they have this power without providing any
clear support or policy reasoning. Instead, courts justify this power
based on the doctrine's murky status as part of a court's inherent
power 152 or as "nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision, permitting displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, .in
light of certain conditions, the trial court thinks that jurisdiction
Both of these justifications are
ought to be declined."1 5 3
questionable.
State courts provide an interesting comparison with respect to
the necessity of, and the accuracy of the inherent-powers justification
for, a sua sponte power. State courts inconsistently approach sua
See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).
Cf WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32 (warning against confusing the forum non conveniens dismissal and transfer remedies).
See Vogt-Nem, Inc. v. M/V Tramper, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1233-34 (N.D. Cal.
148
146
147

2002).
149
See id.; see also Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos v. M/T Respect, 89
F.3d 650, 656 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Heller Financial, Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883
F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989) and Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 757 (3d
Cir. 1973)) (explaining that even though the intervenor waived the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the district court could still raise the issue sua sponte). Importantly, both
Heller Financialand Plum Tree involved § 1404(a) transfers.
150
Seagal v. Vorderwuhlbecke, 162 F. App'x 746, 748 (9th Cir. 2006).
See id.
151
152
See Lear, supra note 1, at 1151.
153
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:819

sponte forum non conveniens dismissals. 154 In a recent unpublished
opinion, a Kentucky state appeals court characterized forum non conveniens as a venue provision and held that "a trial court lacks the
power on its own motion to dismiss a case on [forum non conveniens]
grounds." 155 The court explained that sua sponte power should not
be permitted because the convenience of the venue lies at the heart of
the doctrine and is a personal privilege of the defendant that only the
defendant can waive. 15 6 The Kentucky court reasoned that it could
not invoke the personal privilege of the defendant and therefore
could not dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds on its
own motion. 1 57 Although this approach may unduly disregard inconvenience to the court and forum, the holding illustrates that sua
sponte power is neither necessary nor inherent to the application of
the doctrine.

15 8

States' codifications of forum non conveniens also challenge the
inherent power justification. California explicitly provides in its forum non conveniens statute that judges have the power to raise the
issue sua sponte. 159 However, the highest court of New York interpreted the New York forum non conveniens statute to preclude sua
sponte dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. 160 This interpretation suggests that the power to dismiss sua sponte for forum non
conveniens is not among a court's inherent powers because it could
only be exercised if the statute explicitly granted the court that
power. 16 1 In addition, some state courts have found that courts have a
limited inherent ability to raise forum non conveniens sua sponte.
154
See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 116 (2005) (explicitly recognizing a split on this issue
among state courts).
155
Elder v. Perry County Hosp., Nos. 2005-CA-000591-MR & 2005-CA-001843-MR,
2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 227, at *17 (Ky. Ct. App. July 21, 2006), vacated and remanded, No.
2006-SC-0775-D, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 86 (Ky. Apr. 11, 2007). In September 2007, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky reached the same conclusion in a published opinion after hearing
this case on remand from the Supreme Court of Kentucky. See Elder v. Perry County
Hosp., Nos. 2005-CA-000591-MR & 2005-CA-001843-MR, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 342 (Ky. Ct.
App. Sept. 14, 2007).
156
See Elder, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 227 at *17. Professor Stein supports this view in his
description of venue as simply a right of the parties, rather than a power of the court. See
Stein, supra note 1, at 788.
See Elder, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 227 at *17-18.
157
158
In contrast, Arizona and Arkansas explicitly acknowledge a trial court's right to
raise forum non conveniens sua sponte. See Avila v. Chamberlain, 580 P.2d 1223, 1226
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Country Pride Foods, Ltd. v. Medina & Medina, 648 S.W.2d 485, 486
(Ark. 1983).
159
See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.30(a) (West 2004).
See VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotels & Casinos, Inc., 70 N.E.2d 617, 617 (N.Y. 1988)
160
("[A] court does not have the authority to invoke the doctrine on its own motion.").
See id. But see Verysell-Holding LLC v. Tsukanov, 866 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
161
App. 2004) (holding that the state forum non conveniens rule that imposes a time limit on
such motions did not effect a court's ability to raise the motion on its own even though the
statute does not explicitly grant a sua sponte power).
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For example, Pennsylvania addressed this question when it criticized
such a sua sponte power under the applicable transfer statute but declined to rule on whether a sua sponte dismissal power was per se
erroneous in the forum non conveniens context. 162 In that case, the
court specifically noted that a sua sponte forum non conveniens dismissal is allowed only if the private and public factors weigh strongly in
16 3
favor of dismissal.
Scholars demonstrate similar deficiencies in clarifying how the
public and private interest factors should be considered to best
achieve the goals of forum non conveniens. Those who address
whether the public interest factors alone could be dispositive do so in
conclusory terms. For example, Professor Buxbaum asserts simply
that a court could "raise forum non conveniens sua sponte" and cites
the entire Gulf Oil decision as support. 164 Yet nothing in Gulf Oil explicitly or implicitly recognizes this right. In addition, despite the federal judiciary claiming an inherent power to dismiss sua sponte for
forum non conveniens, Michael Karayanni calls that power a "peculiar
65
procedural consequence."'
IV
IMPROVING FORUM NON CONVENIENS: LIMITING THE WORK
DONE BY THE PUBLIC INTEREST FACTORS

Judges wield quite a sharp "arrow in their dismissal quivers"1 66
when the questionable public interest factors alone are enough to
support a forum non conveniens dismissal. This appears to be the
present law. That the public interest factors can be determinative
highlights the unlimited impact these factors can have in any given
case. This Note proposes that a simple change in the framework
under which judges consider dismissals could limit judicial discretion
and result in a more predictable, workable doctrine. Specifically,
preventing dispositive application of the public interest factors would
limit, but not eliminate, their import, reduce the redundant aspects of
the doctrine in duplicating traditional court-access doctrines, and curtail the ability of self-interested judges to manipulate the public interest factors.
As the following discussion reveals, good reasons exist to limit judicial power with respect to the consideration of factors implicating
public inconvenience. Even just acknowledging a judge's authority to
162

See D'Alterio v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 845 A.2d 850, 855 n.2 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 2004).
163
See id.
164 See Buxbaum, supra note 113, at 198 & n.64.
165
See Karayanni, supra note 7, at 337.
166 Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349, 364 (3d Cir. 2006).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:819

grant a forum non conveniens dismissal sua sponte encourages judges
to ignore the deference they are required to give to all plaintiffs' (including foreign plaintiffs') choice of forum. 167 In general, judges fail
to rein in their discretion and have ample opportunity and motivation
to abuse it by granting inappropriate forum non conveniens dismissals. Reconceptualizing the role of the public interest factors by understanding their limited utility and necessity will help achieve four
policy concerns: (1) limiting de facto foreign policymaking by judges;
(2) curbing judges' excessive discretion and opportunities for abuse;
(3) addressing the failure and duplication of venue and jurisdictional
rules; and (4) optimizing the predictability and efficiency of the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Quite simply, forum non conveniens dismissals that send litigants
to foreign courts are virtually outcome determinative in favor of the
defendant, even for American plaintiffs.1 68 According to Professor
Davies, this "should [only] be the result if it is dictated by the convenience of the parties themselves or by the complete absence of any
connection between the dispute and the U.S. forum. 1 69 However, a
lack of nexus between the dispute and the forum would be avoided by
effectively constructed venue and jurisdictional rules.17 0 Administrative inconvenience is an insufficient reason to deprive American citizens of their legitimate expectation that a U.S. forum will hear their
disputes that satisfy jurisdictional rules and do not inconvenience the
parties. 17 1 The Supreme Court did not design the public interest factors for an international context, and the failure of the public interest
factors in that arena has worsened with time and technological advances. 172 For both American and foreign plaintiffs, whether the pub73
lic interest factors should ever be considered is questionable.
Forum non conveniens dismissals are highly sought after by defendants because such dismissals often represent the end to litigation;
dismissed plaintiffs are rarely able to litigate in the "available" alternative foreign forum. 174 Thus, in the very common scenario in which a
167
Although PiperAircraft instructs that a foreign plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled
to less deference, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981), courts should
remember that "less deference is not the same thing as no deference." Ravelo Monegro v.
Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2000).
168
See In reAir Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1156 (5th Cir.
1987) (en banc); Robertson, supra note 1, at 363-64.
169 Davies, supra note 7, at 373.
170
See Stein, supra note 1, at 843-44.
171
See Davies, supra note 7, at 373; Lear, supra note 1, at 1189.
See Davies, supra note 7, at 312-13.
172

173

See id. at 374.

See Robertson, supra note 1, at 363-64. Statutes of limitation, costs, and other barriers to litigation in the alternative forum often prevent the plaintiff from bringing suit
there. Id. at 364 n.87; see Thomas 0. Main, JudicialDiscretion to Condition, 79 TEMP. L. REv.
174

1075, 1085 (2006).
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foreign plaintiff attempts to sue an American defendant, federal
courts engage in de facto foreign policymaking by limiting the right of
foreign plaintiffs to redress harms in American courts and by immunizing American corporate defendants from liability for their acts
abroad.1 75 The Supreme Court's decision in PiperAircraft instructing
federal courts to give a foreign plaintiffs choice of forum less deference than an American plaintiff's similar choice 176 strengthens the argument that judges may effectively be making foreign policy through
forum non conveniens dismissals. 177 As Professor Davies explains, the
only possible justification for treating foreign plaintiffs less favorably is
found in the Gulf Oil public interest factors.1 78 By considering those
factors, district court judges are empowered to dictate, beyond congressionally determined jurisdictional and venue requirements,
17 9
whether and how foreign plaintiffs litigate in American courts.
This occurs because the public interest factors will very often weigh in
favor of dismissal when a foreign plaintiff is seeking redress of a harm
180
that occurred outside of the United States.
Currently, the federal judiciary uses forum non conveniens to
control the number of international disputes adjudicated in federal
courts. Federal courts are "more concerned about the administrative
burdens imposed on them, on the United States taxpayers, and on
juries if they retain such actions, than with the consequences to forThis outcome is based largely on
eign plaintiffs if they dismiss."''
undue consideration of the public factors. 182 Whether restricting access to foreign plaintiffs is substantively a worthwhile outcome is not
addressed here. 18 3 However, the widespread application of this judicial "housekeeping" doctrine systematically imposes substantive outcomes on foreign plaintiffs and functions as a policy on transnational
litigation that Congress, rather than the courts, is better equipped to
84
handle. 1
"If the jurisdictional nexus affords a court with jurisdiction but
the application of which is felt to be unjust in the particular case, then
175 See Lear, supra note 1, at 1191.
176 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981).
177 See Lear, supra note 1, at 1190-92.
178 See Davies, supra note 7, at 370 ("The only reason for turning away foreign plaintiffs
more readily than American ones is concern about burdening the administration ofjustice
in the U.S. courts.").
179

See id.

180 See id. at 375-77.
181 Heiser, supra note 43, at 1189.
182 See id. at 1188-89.
183 For a general discussion of the United States as a magnet forum and how to limit
foreign plaintiffs' access, see Russell J. Weintraub, The United States as a Magnet Forum and
What, if Anything, to Do About It, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION
OF FORUM SELECTION (Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 1997).
184 See Lear, supra note 1, at 1190-92.
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there must be something flawed with that nexus ... ,"185 That flaw is
the current application, and possibly formulation,18 6 of personal and
subject-matter jurisdictional rules. 187 Judges and litigants use forum
non conveniens as a remedial device to achieve outcomes that could
be achieved in a more straightforward and consistent manner through
other procedural devices. 188 For example, the need to correct for forum shopping by international plaintiffs and to avoid litigation that is
inappropriately situated in a court with little or no connection to the
subject matter in controversy is often a failure of applicable personal
and subject-matter jurisdiction statutes.1 8 9
Restricting the impact of the public interest factors will reduce
the overlap between forum non conveniens doctrine and venue and
jurisdictional rules because courts would no longer need to consider
the "reasonableness" of the forum twice. 190 This would force those
rules to do the preliminary work of ensuring a reasonable connection
with the forum. 19 1 This approach should, in most cases, address the
Gulf Oil public interest factors. Effective venue and jurisdictional statutes should ensure that the jury duty burden would not be a significant concern and that the forum state has a sufficient connection with
the subject matter so that any resulting inconvenience is reasonable. 192 Nevertheless, personal jurisdiction would not protect all defendants from harassment;1 93 therefore, a discretionary doctrine like
forum non conveniens will always be required to ensure that plaintiffs
194
do not unnecessarily harass defendants by their choice of forum.
Still, the volume of work currently done by the forum non convenience doctrine would be more appropriately done by formal venue
and jurisdictional rules that, unlike the forum non conveniens doc95
trine, restrict judges' discretion and allow for full appellate review.1
Karayanni, supra note 7, at 332-33.
See Robertson, supra note 1, at 378.
187
See Lear, supra note 1, at 1158; Stein, supra note 1, at 795.
188
See Lear, supra note 1, at 1164 ("Each time a court dismisses a case on forum non
conveniens grounds, it displaces the congressional value judgment that the dispute may
conveniently be heard by the federal courts.").
189
See Stein, supra note 1, at 784 ("Although frequently associated with 'convenience,'
the doctrine has not been limited in application to insuring a convenient trial. Rather,
courts invoking the doctrine have taken into consideration the very question purportedly
addressed by jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law: which government has the appropriate
relationship of the parties and the controversy to justify resolving the dispute in its courts
or under its law." (footnote omitted)).
190 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 378.
185
186

191

See id.

192 See Davies, supra note 7, at 376.
193 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 379.
194 See id. at 378.
195 See id. at 378-79; Stein, supra note 1, at 793-94 ("The significance of this overlap is
that most of the policies addressed in decisions about jurisdiction and venue are also ad-
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If federal courts applied the forum non conveniens test with the
simple understanding that the public interest factors have a very limited role and cannot form the sole basis for a dismissal, it could eventually lead to more efficient and predictable court-access decisions.
The public interest factors, in theory, ensure that the dispute is sufficiently connected to the forum so that any inconvenience to the forum is an appropriate burden. 19 6 For example, a district court has no
choice but to adjudicate a complex class action if it is the most appropriate forum and the case is situated there under the applicable personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and venue rules.
Ensuring a sufficient connection to the forum is traditionally the
job of jurisdictional and venue rules. 19 7 Unfortunately, federal courts
have not confined forum non conveniens to the rare cases in which
those rules have failed. Instead, judges routinely exercise their wide
discretion to determine that many international tort and contract disputes would be more appropriately adjudicated in an alternative forum. Consistency could be achieved by forcing judges to make that
nexus determination more openly and formally through jurisdictional
rules, instead of leaving it to the purely discretionary process of forum
non conveniens. 198 Severely curtailing the import of the public interest factors in the informal and inconsistent forum non conveniens
analysis would force the judiciary to include the considerations embodied in those factors in its jurisdiction and venue determinations.
That is, judges would be unable to avoid relying on the relatively more
formal and rule-based court-access doctrines to dismiss a case that is
insufficiently connected to the forum, rather than resorting to the
purely discretionary forum non conveniens doctrine, which is subject
to only limited appellate review. Given these considerations, the Supreme Court should have affirmed the Third Circuit's Sinochem holding and required courts to find subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction before proceeding with forum non conveniens analysis. 199
Such a decision would have promoted the use of the more predictable, consistent, and reviewable jurisdictional rules. In addition, that
ruling would have reinforced the limited role of the public interest
factors in forum non conveniens analysis-a court would have considered reasonableness of the forum, and thus the dispute's connection
to the forum, under the reviewable personal jurisdiction, subject-matdressed in the context of forum non conveniens, a doctrine practically devoid of hard
rules, vested in the discretion of the trial court, and beyond effective appellate review.").
196 Cf Davies, supra note 7, at 376 (stating that when certain conditions are met, "the
U.S. court would have a legitimate public interest in hearing the dispute, however inconvenient it might be for it to do so").
197
See Stein, supra note 1, at 784.
198 See id. at 845-46 n.268.
199 See Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 2006).

846

CORNELL LAW RIEW

[Vol. 93:819

ter jurisdiction, and venue doctrines before engaging in the forum
non conveniens analysis. Unfortunately, the Court's decision permits
federal courts to decide forum non conveniens before jurisdictional
requirements, thereby encouraging federal courts to place even
greater emphasis on forum non conveniens as an appropriate way to
dismiss cases.
Judges motivated by self-interest can use forum non conveniens
to dismiss cases that would be burdensome, complex, orjust generally
annoying. 20 0 Limiting the role of the public interest factors in forum
non conveniens decisions will make the doctrine clearer, easier to apply, and less subject to these improper motivations.2 0 1 Furthermore,
restricting consideration of the largely irrelevant public interest factors20 2 to circumstances in which some private interest factor supports
dismissal will help to serve a central goal of the doctrine: preventing
harassment of defendants without compromising the need to have disputes heard in a sufficiently appropriate forum.
CONCLUSION

The policy concerns outlined above are poorly addressed by the
current formulation of the forum non conveniens doctrine. Although
scholars have recognized these deficiencies before, the suggestions for
improving the doctrine have generally been wide sweeping and would
require action by Congress or the Supreme Court. I propose a more
subtle, but important, change that federal courts can apply consistently with current case law. This change requires a simple shift in how
practitioners and decision makers perceive and understand the doctrine. Of course, it is impossible to alter the framework of every district court judge faced with forum non conveniens questions.
Nevertheless, these suggestions serve more as a reminder about the
function and limits of the doctrine than as a rule to be strictly applied.
Lower courts could also implement other potential improvements to the doctrine with or without congressional or Supreme
Court involvement. First, the Fifth Circuit approach appears at first to
limit the impact of the public factors because they are only considered
if the private interest factors do not favor dismissal (that is, if they are
neutral or point to the convenience of the present forum). Yet, this
does not effectively limit the influence of the malleable public interest
200
See supra text accompanying notes 60-68. In a rather harsh description of courts'
inconsistent and unprincipled application of the doctrine, Professor Robertson stated that
"forum non conveniens ... is not properly speaking a legal doctrine at all, but rather a
loose collection of habitual practices and attitudes." Robertson, supra note 1, at 360.
201
See Davies, supra note 7, at 384-85 (explaining that when the predictability of out-

comes increases, the ease and number of settlement negotiations will also increase and
result in a reduction in the number of cases brought to court).
202 See supra Part II.
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factors because the only impact they can have is as the deciding factors in favor of granting a forum non conveniens dismissal. This affords the public interest factors too much weight and gives trial judges
too much discretion; it also ignores the Supreme Court's mandate to
20 3
balance the relevant factors.
Second, as alluded to earlier, courts could also use an unreasonableness standard to limit the impact of the public interest factors.
This suggestion would require gross unreasonableness, in terms of the
inconvenience imposed by the litigation on the court and the forum,
to justify a dismissal grounded solely on the public interest factors.
That is, the public factors alone could not support a forum non conveniens dismissal unless inconvenience to the court and forum rises to
the level of unreasonableness. 20 4 A court could be required to satisfy
this more burdensome standard when public interest factors alone are
motivating dismissal and could provide protection against uncontrolled discretion.
Third, Professor Martin Davies suggests "far-reaching reform s]"
to either eliminate courts' consideration of the public interest factors
altogether or expand courts' consideration into an interest analysis
like that used in choice of law. 20 5 He reasons that the current test

makes an unnecessary and harmful distinction between American and
foreign plaintiffs and that courts should consider the interests of the
forum state, not just its courts, so that a substantial connection with
the forum ensures that the forum state has some policy reason to hear
the case. 206 Davies also suggests that trial courts engage in a comparative policy-based analysis of the broad public interests that the competing forums would have in hearing the dispute in order to make a
forum non conveniens decision.2 0 7 As Davies admits, this new test
20 8
would require action by Congress or the Supreme Court.
Short of the Supreme Court speaking on the issue, the current
public-private dichotomy controls the decision-making process. I
propose retaining the factors as they are but applying the test with the
203

204

See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
Professor Bickel provided an example of how to narrow the forum non conveniens

test:
(A] specially narrow area of discretion can be circumscribed to protect foreign defendants in cases of great hardship. The[re] should be dismissal
only when flagrant injustice would be done by allowing the suit to proceed.
This would mean cases in which all factors of convenience point to the
defendant's forum and the [plaintiff's] only possible purpose in bring[ing]
suit here was to harass defendant into an unfavorable settlement.
Bickel, supra note 1, at 45.
205
See Davies, supra note 7, at 378, 384.
206 See id. at 376.
207
See id. at 377.
208 See id. at 383.
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understanding that the private interest factors are considerably more
important. 20 9 Beyond the various weaknesses in the current public
interest factors, the job of a court is to hear and decide disputes. Refusing to do so after a plaintiff has satisfied all threshold requirements
simply because a particular trial judge has determined, through the
exercise of unguided and unreviewable forum non conveniens discretion, that the specific nature of the dispute inconveniences the forum
is inconsistent with this fundamental purpose. Public factors alone
should never support such a dismissal. Thus, only if the private factors favor dismissal should a court use the public factors to further tip
the balance in favor of dismissal. This suggestion should be seen not
as a rule, but as a framework through which judges evaluate forum
non conveniens decisions.

209

See 17JAMEsWM. MooRE, MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §

111.74(3)(b) (3ded. 2007).

